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DEFENSE COUNSEL AS PROSECUTION
WITNESSES: A COMBINED DOCTRINE TO
GOVERN ATTORNEY DISCLOSURE
Abstract Prosecutors have increasingly used grand juries to compel defense attorneys
to disclose client administrative data such as clients' names, fee amounts, or third-party
fee payments. A majority of the federal circuit courts protect administrative information
only if disclosure would reveal the substance of previous attorney-client conversations. In
contrast, a minority of the circuits protect such information when disclosure would
incriminate a client in the case at bar. This Comment argues that neither of the current
doctrines accomplishes the goals of the attorney-client privilege. Instead, a doctrine that
combines the majority and minority views would more effectively promote the policies
underlying the attorney-client privilege.
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of all evidentiary privi-
leges,' yet the law governing this fundamental area of Anglo-Ameri-
can judicial practice remains unsettled.2 Particularly troublesome is
whether the privilege protects administrative information such as the
names of clients, the amount of fees paid for representation, or third-
party payments of fees.
Since the 1980s, prosecutors have increasingly challenged the tradi-
tional view that defense lawyers should not be called as witnesses
against their own clients.' Following the United States Justice
Department's lead, prosecutors have subpoenaed defense attorneys as
witnesses before grand juries to learn administrative information about
the attorneys' clients.4 Three basic fact patterns compel prosecutors to
call defense attorneys to the stand. Two of these patterns involve
unidentified persons and the third involves unidentified sums of
money.
The first instance arises when a third party wants to pay a defend-
ant's legal expenses. For example, in drug conspiracy cases a drug
lord may intend to pay for an employee's defense.5 In an attempt to
gather evidence connecting the drug lord to the case at trial, the prose-
1. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)
§ 2290, at 542. See generally Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege,
66 CALIF. L. REV. 1061 (1978).
2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS xi (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1989).
3. Stern & Hoffman, Privileged Informers The Attorney Subpoena Problem and a Proposal for
Reform, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1783, 1787-88 (1988).
4. See, eg., In re Attorney Representing Criminal Defendant Reyes-Requena, 913 F.2d 1118,
1123 (5th Cir. 1990), cert denied, Il S. Ct. 1581 (1991).
5. Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1517 n.91
(1985) [hereinafter Developments].
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cutor calls the defense attorney as a witness to learn the name of the
third-party benefactor.
In the second case, after consultation with an attorney, a taxpayer
wants to anonymously remit underpaid back taxes. By paying the
taxes, the taxpayer hopes to avoid compounding penalties should the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) learn of the underpayment. The IRS,
however, would like to collect any penalties and taxes that the tax-
payer might owe. Upon receipt of the payment, the IRS calls the
attorney before a grand jury to begin its investigation.6
The third fact pattern also involves an alleged underpayment of
taxes. The prosecutor asks the defense attorney to divulge how much
money the defendant has paid in legal fees. With this tactic, the prose-
cutor hopes to prove that the defendant received unreported income.7
Federal courts currently employ competing doctrines to define the
scope of the attorney-client privilege. Several circuits protect adminis-
trative information when disclosure would incriminate a client in the
case at bar.' A majority of the courts, however, shield administrative
information only when disclosure would reveal the substance of a pre-
vious confidential communication.' Neither of these approaches, act-
ing alone, effectuate the principles underlying the attorney-client
privilege. Instead, a test combining the current approaches will more
effectively protect the goals and principles of the attorney-client
privilege.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVILEGE GOVERNING
ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION
A. Goals of the Attorney-Client Privilege
The primary goal of the attorney-client privilege is to promote cli-
ents' subjective freedom to obtain legal advice. In Fisher v. United
States,10 the Supreme Court concluded that the legal system can meet
this primary goal only by eliminating clients' fear that their attorneys
6. Id.
7. Id. Although IRS regulations require attorneys to disclose the name, address, and
taxpayer identification number of persons transferring over $10,000 in cash, these regulations do
not affect attorneys' obligations to raise the attorney-client privilege. Michigan State Bar Comm.
on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. RI-54 (1990).
8. See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 64-76 and accompanying text.
10. 425 U.S. 391, 403-04 (1976).
1082
Vol. 66:1081, 1991
Defense Counsel as Prosecution Witness
will disclose damaging information." Encouraging persons to seek
legal assistance benefits the public by promoting obedience to the law
and administration of justice.12
Three policies underlie the attorney-client privilege. First, the attor-
ney-client privilege protects innocent clients' rights.' 3 As the Ameri-
can legal system grows more complex, the line between guilt and
innocence becomes increasingly blurred.' 4 Without competent legal
assistance, clients cannot determine or defend their rights. 5 Innocent
clients who fear that their attorneys will disclose incriminating infor-
mation, however, may decide either to forego counsel or to avoid a
legal remedy altogether. 6
Second, the attorney-client privilege ensures accuracy in legal pro-
ceedings.17 Although removing the privilege would not deter the
guilty from obtaining legal help,'" it would encourage wrongdoers to
lie or fail to disclose information to their attorneys.' 9 Thus, without
the privilege, attorneys may be forced to work with partial or inade-
quate knowledge of their clients' cases and may not be able to provide
effective legal counsel.2"
Third, the attorney-client privilege encourages people to obey the
law. Many laws are so complex that even law-abiding citizens some-
times need legal assistance to understand the legal intricacies.2 ' The
privilege allows clients to seek advice without fear of disclosure.22 As
a result, clients will be better informed and more capable of following
the law.23
Despite these beneficial aspects, the attorney-client privilege poten-
tially hinders courts by obscuring information from the fact-finder.24
11. Id.;see Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (attorney-client.privilege shields
employee conversations with corporate counsel); see also J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2291, at
545.
12. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
13. Developments, supra note 5, at 1505-07.
14. Id.; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2291, at 552.
15. 8 J. WIOMORE, supra note 1, § 2291, at 552.
16. See, eg., E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87, at 204-06 (3d ed. 1984)
[hereinafter MCCORMICK].
17. The privilege encourages clients to fully disclose the facts of their situations to their
attorneys. Id Once attorneys have obtained accurate facts, they are in a better position to
represent their clients. Id
18. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2292, at 553-54.
19. lId
20. See MCCORMICK, supra note 16, § 87, at 204-05.
21. Developments, supra note 5, at 1506.
22. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
23. See Developments, supra note 5, at 1506.
24. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).
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Because one of the legal system's primary functions is to discover the
truth,25 commentators agree that courts should interpret the privilege
only so far as to carry out its underlying principles.26 The Supreme
Court has followed this analysis, holding that courts should narrowly
construe the privilege because it hinders the search for truth." Fur-
thermore, the Court recognized that to effectuate its goals, the attor-
ney-client privilege must be predictive. 28 An uncertain privilege, the
Court concluded, is little better than no privilege at all.z9
In an attempt to follow the Supreme Court's directive, modern
courts have struggled to develop a rational test that balances the com-
peting interests of client confidentiality and full disclosure of the
truth.30 As one aspect of this balancing, courts have adopted James
Wigmore's formulation of the privilege.31 According to Wigmore,
when clients seek legal advice from attorneys, private communications
relating to that advice are protected from attorney disclosure.32
The current dispute concerning the privilege's protection of admin-
istrative information involves two aspects of Wigmore's formulation.
One source of disagreement stems from attempts to define "communi-
cation." Although communication includes more than just oral
exchanges, courts do not agree whether client administrative data fits
within the boundaries of this term.33 Wigmore suggests that commu-
nications include a client making a handwriting specimen, displaying
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2291, at 554.
27. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 709. Additionally, the crime-fraud exception denies protection for a
client who consults with an attorney in furtherance of crime. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1,
§ 2298, at 572. Because courts developed the attorney-client privilege to promote justice, the
crime-fraud exception asserts that it would pervert the privilege to protect a client who seeks
advice in pursuit of an illegal or fraudulent scheme. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, § 95, at 229.
The exception applies if a prosecutor can establish that a client is using an attorney to engage in
crime or fraud. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933). If the exception applies, then the
attorney-client privilege will not protect administrative information, regardless of which doctrine
a court might employ. See MCCORMICK, supra note 16, § 95, at 229-30.
28. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
29. Id.
30. Evidentiary privileges in the federal courts are governed by common law. FED. R. EVID.
501.
31. In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 492-93 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980); Radiant
Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 323-24 (7th Cir. 1963) (en banc), cert
denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
32. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2292, at 554.
33. Id. § 2306, at 590. Compare In re Cherney, 898 F.2d 565, 567 (7th Cir. 1990) (client
administrative information conveys information that the attorney-client privilege may protect)
with Rabin v. United States, 896 F.2d 1267 (1 1th Cir.) ("communication" includes only verbal
statements or physical acts intended as information about the client's problem; it does not
include fee payments or the client's name), vacated, 904 F.2d 1498 (1 1th Cir. 1990).
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an identifying scar, or showing a secret token. 4 If the client performs
any of these acts while consulting 5 with an attorney, then the privi-
lege protects the exchange.36
A second source of disagreement has been the definition of "client."
In particular, courts have argued whether a person who hires an attor-
ney to pay for someone else's defense is a client.37 On the one hand,
Wigmore stresses that every civil litigant is entitled to know the oppo-
nent's identity.3" On the other hand, Wigmore notes that the privilege
should protect certain client administrative information.3 9 He argues
that courts should protect administrative information which conveys
the ultimate motive of litigation.4 Whether courts should protect
administrative information, according to Wigmore, depends on the
facts of each case.41
B. Judicial Development of the Privilege Governing Client
Administrative Information
Federal courts' treatment of client administrative information began
in 1960 with Baird v. Koerner. 2 Subsequent courts derived two last-
ing doctrines from the Baird decision. First, the legal advice doctrine
focuses on whether disclosure of administrative information incrimi-
nates the client.43 Second, the confidential communication doctrine
protects administrative information when disclosure would reveal the
content of other attorney-client communications.' Federal courts
currently rely on either the legal advice doctrine or the confidential
communication doctrine,4' but no court since Baird has fully com-
bined the two theories."
34. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2306, at 590.
35. Consultation is the "act of... conferring; e.g.,... client with lawyer." BLAcK's LAW
DICTIONARY 286 (5th ed. 1979).
36. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2306, at 590.
37. See, eg., In re Attorney Representing Criminal Defendant Reyes-Requena, 913 F.2d
1118, 1123 (5th Cir. 1990); Cherney, 898 F.2d at 568.
38. 8 J. WIGMOmE supra note 1, § 2313, at 609 (courts should not force litigants to "struggle
in the dark against unknown forces").
39. Id
40. Ia
41. Id at 610.
42. 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
43. United States v. Hedge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir. 1977).
44. United States v. Liebman, 742 F.2d 807, 808-09 (3d Cir. 1984).
45. See infra notes 60-76 and accompanying text.
46. The "last link" doctrine, a short-lived development originating in the Fifth Circuit,
shielded client administrative information that formed the final link in a chain of inculpatory
evidence. United States v. Jones, 517 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1975). Although several circuits noted
the fundamental fairness of the last link doctrine, only the Eleventh Circuit joined the Fifth in
1085
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1. The Baird Decision
Baird v. Koerner47 forms the legal cornerstone of contemporary
efforts to analyze issues of client administrative information. In Baird,
the Ninth Circuit restated the general rule that client administrative
information is usually not privileged.48 The court then created a lim-
ited exception to this general rule which protects client confidential
information in limited circumstances. 9
The Baird case originated with a tax dispute. Alva Baird, a tax
attorney, directed several businessmen who had underpaid their taxes
to remit the unpaid amounts to the IRS without disclosing their
names.50 This strategy would place the businessmen in a favorable
position if the IRS learned about the disputed underpayments and
filed criminal charges. 1 After receiving the payments, the IRS initi-
ated court action to compel Baird to disclose the names of the busi-
nessmen.52 Baird refused, citing the attorney-client privilege, and the
district court found him in contempt.5 3
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that Baird did not have to dis-
close his clients' names. 4 The court based its holding on two comple-
mentary grounds. First, the court reasoned that the voluntary
payment of overdue taxes communicated a feeling of guilt stemming
from a nonpayment of taxes.5 The guilty feeling may not have been
of a criminal nature, but the feeling conveyed the businessmen's rea-
son for contacting an attorney.56 Disclosing the businessmen's names,
therefore, would reveal the substance of a confidential communication
between the clients and Baird. 7 Second, the court noted that the gov-
adopting the doctrine. Compare In re Twist, 689 F.2d 1351 (1lth Cir. 1982) (adopting last link
doctrine) with In re Anderson, 906 F.2d 1485, 1491 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting last link's fairness,
but rejecting); In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35 (Durant), 723 F.2d 447, 453-54 (6th
Cir. 1983) (noting last link's fairness but rejecting), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1246 (1984). Courts
originally adopting the doctrine now reject their earlier decisions. See In re Attorney
Representing Criminal Defendant Reyes-Requena, 913 F.2d 1118, 1124-25 (5th Cir. 1990)
(arguing Jones did not actually articulate a last link doctrine); see also Rabin v. United States,
896 F.2d 1267 (11th Cir. 1990) (uses term "last link" but takes precedent and logic from
confidential communication decisions), vacated, 896 F.2d 1267, 1283 (1 1th Cir. 1990).
47. 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
48. Id. at 630-31.
49. Id. at 631.
50. Id. at 626.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 627
53. Id.
54. Id. at 635.
55. Id. at 633.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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ernment wanted the names only for their incriminatory nature."8 Ulti-
mately, the court protected the clients' names, stating that revelation
"may well be the link that could form the chain of testimony necessary
to convict [the] individual[s] of a federal crime."59
2. Legal Advice Doctrine
The first enduring offshoot from Baird, the legal advice doctrine,
focuses on the damaging results flowing from the disclosure of client
information." The legal advice doctrine shields client administrative
information when disclosure would implicate a client in the very activ-
ity for which the client sought legal advice.61 By protecting incrimi-
nating information, this doctrine attempts to promote clients'
subjective freedom to consult legal advisors.62 According to propo-
nents of the legal advice doctrine, courts can enact the policy of the
attorney-client privilege only if the law prohibits disclosure of incrimi-
natory client communications.63
3. Confidential Communication Doctrine
The second theory evolving from Baird, the confidential communi-
cation doctrine, hinges on the definition of "communication" to deter-
mine whether the attorney-client privilege protects administrative
58. Id.
59. Id The court differentiated the situation from one in which a taxpayer had filed suit
against the government. Id. at 630-31. The court reasoned that public policy clearly requires
disclosure of plaintiffs' identities because concealing plaintiffs' identities denies defendants their
right to confront their accuser. Id, at 630 (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2313, at
609-10). The clients in Baird, however, were not plaintiffs in litigation. Id at 630. Rather, the
taxpayers were merely stating through their attorney their concern over possible underpayment
of taxes. Id at 631. The taxpayers were not attempting to anonymously take advantage of the
court system, but instead sought to avoid the court system altogether. See id, at 630-31 (quoting
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2313, at 609-10).
60. In re Anderson, 906 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1990).
61. United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir. 1977). Richard Hodge
and Robert Zweig were law partners representing various clients implicated in a drug-related
conspiracy. Id at 1349. In an attempt to find evidence of unreported income to use in a tax-
evasion case, the prosecution asked the attorneys to divulge client fee information to a grand
jury. Idr The court stated the fee information was not privileged because disclosure of the fee
would not implicate the clients in the very conspiracy for which they sought advice. Id. at 1353.
62. Id at 1353.
63. Id (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2291, at 545). Within six years of Hodge &
Zweig, courts in five circuits accepted the legal advice doctrine. See In re Grand Jury
Investigation No. 83-2-35 (Durant), 723 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1983) (also adopted confidential
communication doctrine), cert denied, 467 U.S. 1246 (1984); In re Harvey, 676 F.2d 1005, 1009
(4th Cir.), vacated, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982); In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Strahl, 590 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1978), cer. denied, 440 U.S. 918 (1979).
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information.' Federal courts have developed two interpretations of
the confidential communication doctrine. The first interpretation, the
communication-centered approach, focuses exclusively on the nature
of the communication between client and attorney. The second inter-
pretation, the attorney-centered approach, examines the effect of dis-
closure on the attorney's ability to provide counsel.65
The majority of courts follow the communication-centered
approach, which protects only those transfers of client administrative
information that would necessarily reveal the content of previous con-
fidential conversations. 66 For example, the confidential communica-
tion doctrine acts as a shield when prosecutors know the substance of
previous conversations between clients and attorneys but do not know
the clients' names.67
Current court decisions following the communication-centered
approach 68 have established a two-prong test to analyze client admin-
istrative information. Defense attorneys must satisfy both prongs
before the attorney-client privilege will protect client administrative
information. 69 First, disclosing client administrative information must
amount to a disclosure of previous confidential communications.7"
Second, the previous communication must concern a case currently
under investigation. 7' For example, the communication-centered
approach would shield a client's identity when revealing the identity to
the police would name the client as the perpetrator of a crime under
investigation.72
64. United States v. Liebman, 742 F.2d 807, 808-09 (3d Cir. 1984).
65. The Sixth Circuit adopted both the legal advice doctrine and the confidential
communication doctrine. Durant, 723 F.2d at 452-53 (finding that both doctrines were well
grounded in logic and precedent).
66. See, e.g., Doe 1 v. Under Seal, 926 F.2d 348, 352-53 (4th Cir. 1991); In re Special March
1980 Grand Jury, 729 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1984); Liebman, 742 F.2d at 810; In re Osterhoudt, 722
F.2d 591, 594 (9th Cir. 1983); In re Slaughter, 694 F.2d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 1982); see also In
re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984) (protects communications revealing privileged information
only if revelation would harm attorney's effectiveness).
67. Liebman, 742 F.2d at 807. Liebman, an attorney and a real estate broker, attempted to
negotiate several real estate transactions for his clients. Id. at 809. Liebman charged only those
clients who entered into real estate transactions. Id. Several clients improperly deducted these
fees as legal expenses. Id. Before a subsequent grand jury, Liebman refused to disclose his
clients' names to the IRS. Id. The Third Circuit shielded the information, holding that
disclosing the names to the IRS would reveal the substance of prior confidential conversations
Liebman held with his clients. Id. at 810.
68. See supra note 66.
69. In re Anderson, 906 F.2d 1485, 1492 (10th Cir. 1990).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. In another recent development, the Seventh Circuit adopted a more liberal
interpretation of the confidential communication doctrine. In re Cherney, 898 F.2d 565, 568 (7th
1088
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An alternative interpretation of the confidential communication
doctrine, the attorney-centered approach, focuses on the attorneys'
ability to provide legal services.7 3 Under this interpretation, the attor-
ney-client privilege protects attorneys from the dilemma of either
gathering all necessary data from the client or shielding the client from
compelled disclosure.7 4 Instead, if disclosure impairs attorneys' ability
to provide legal advice, then the attorney-client privilege protects that
information. 75 Conversely, if disclosure does not impair counsel effec-
tiveness, then prosecutors can elicit the client's administrative
information.76
In sum, the dispute over the proper interpretation of the Baird deci-
sion continues. Although recent court decisions profess a growing
consensus of circuits adopting the confidential communication doc-
trine," the apparent consensus is illusory. The fundamental dispute
over whether the attorney-client privilege should protect client admin-
istrative information based on the incrimination rationale of the legal
advice doctrine or on the communication rationale of the confidential
communication doctrine remains unsettled.
II. CURRENT DOCTRINES DO NOT EFFECTUATE THE
GOALS OF THE AITORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Modern courts view the legal advice doctrine and the confidential
communication doctrine as mutually exclusive means of examining
client administrative information. Courts' exclusive adoption of either
doctrine fails to adequately protect clients' right to obtain fully-
informed legal assistance. To correct this failure, courts should accept
Cir. 1990). The court held that the attorney-client privilege shielded an attorney's refusal to
disclose the name of a third-party benefactor who paid for a drug defendant's legal fees when
both the defendant and the benefactor were clients. Id at 569. The third-party payment
represented an acknowledgement of a tie between the benefactor and the defendant. d at 568.
The appeals court concluded that disclosure of the benefactor's identity would reveal the premise
of a confidential communication between an attorney and a client. Id
73. See In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1984). This variation draws on the theory that
the attorney-client privilege enables attorneys to act effectively, justly, and expeditiously. See 2 J.
W NSTEmN & M. BERGER, EVIDENCE § 503(2) (1990).
74. Rabin v. United States, 896 F.2d 1267, 1275 (1990) (referencing Shargel, 742 F.2d at 63).
75. Shargel, 742 F.2d at 64.
76. Id
77. See, eg., Doe I v. Under Seal, 926 F.2d 348, 352 (4th Cir. 1991) (stating that most
circuits now follow the confidential communication doctrine); In re Attorney Representing
Criminal Defendant Reyes-Requena, 913 F.2d 1118, 1123-24 (5th Cir. 1990) (rejects the Jones
court's interpretation of the last link doctrine in favor of the confidential communication
doctrine); In re Anderson, 906 F.2d 1485, 1488-92 (10th Cir. 1990) (notes demise of last link
doctrine and adopts confidential communication doctrine).
1089
Washington Law Review
that both doctrines have legitimate applications.78 The resulting privi-
lege will give courts a framework through which they can analyze
each case on its individual merits. Such an individual evaluation is
necessary to implement the policies of the attorney-client privilege.
A. The Legal Advice Doctrine Is Too Narrow
Although the legal advice doctrine addresses many issues funda-
mental to the attorney-client privilege, courts adopting the legal advice
doctrine have interpreted it too narrowly. Currently, the legal advice
doctrine fails to protect attorney-client contacts that are not directly
related to the case at bar. This failure results in a doctrine that does
not encourage clients to seek legal advice.
The legal advice doctrine protects only those exchanges that tend to
implicate a client in the very crime for which the client sought
advice.7 9 For example, the doctrine shields a client's name from dis-
closure to the IRS when the client originally sought advice concerning
a possible tax liability. 0 Clients, however, may want to remain anony-
mous for reasons unrelated to the case before the court. Two exam-
ples of desired anonymity include clients with questionable
immigration status or tax standing.81 Disclosure of client administra-
tive information in either instance might harm the client. Yet, because
the disclosure would be unrelated to the case for which the client
sought advice, the legal advice doctrine would provide the client no
protection.
As a result of this narrow interpretation, clients may refrain from
seeking necessary legal advice. Clients who fear that their attorneys
will disclose damaging information may forego representation.82
Without adequate legal representation, clients may not be able to fully
assess their legal claims and may fail to receive justice. Because the
legal advice doctrine may dissuade clients from seeking legal advice,
the doctrine does not fully enact the principles of the attorney-client
privilege.
78. The Sixth Circuit has adopted this approach. In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35
(Durant), 723 F.2d 447, 452-53 (6th Cir. 1983).
79. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
80. Baird v. Koerner, 273 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
81. Stern & Hoffman, supra note 3, at 1799.
82. In re Cherney, 898 F.2d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 1990); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,
403 (1976).
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B. The Confidential Communication Doctrine Does Not Accomplish
the Goals of the Attorney-Client Privilege
Like the legal advice doctrine, the confidential communication doc-
trine fails to encourage clients to seek legal advice. Under the two
primary interpretations of the doctrine, the courts focus on issues
which do not correlate to clients' fears of disclosure. The communica-
tion-centered interpretation focuses too strictly on the definition of
"communication." The attorney-centered view of the doctrine, on the
other hand, misinterprets the policies underlying the attorney-client
privilege by focusing on attorneys' fears instead of clients' fears.
1. The Communication-Centered Interpretation of the Confidential
Communication Doctrine Is Too Narrow
The communication-centered approach fails to fully implement the
goals of the attorney-client privilege. By incorrectly interpreting pre-
cedent, the approach has developed too narrow a scope and is not pre-
dictive. As a result, attorneys are without guidance in their dealings
with clients.
The communication-centered interpretation of the confidential com-
munication doctrine misinterprets precedent by focusing exclusively
on whether disclosure reveals the content of previous conversations.8 3
By so doing, the confidential communication doctrine attempts to cat-
egorize attorney-client contacts as either communicative acts or non-
communicative acts." This narrow decision base fails to consider
whether disclosure of client administrative information furthers the
principles of the attorney-client privilege. As a result, the doctrine
may allow disclosure of client information that has little value to the
courts, yet devastates the attorney-client relationship. 5
A close reading of Baird, however, reveals that the Ninth Circuit
protected client administrative information not only because it repre-
sented a communication, but also because the evidence may have
83. See, e-g., In re Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591, 592-93 (9th Cir. 1983); In re Anderson, 906
F.2d 1485, 1492 (10th Cir. 1990); In re Attorney Representing Criminal Defendant Reyes-
Requena, 913 F.2d 1118, 1125 (5th Cir. 1990).
84. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
85. For example, in In re Newton, 899 F.2d 1039 (11th Cir. 1990), the court upheld a grand
jury demand that the defense attorney, Newton, disclose his client's name and the client's fee
amount. Id at 1044-45. Although grand juries have the power to call attorneys, trial courts do
not because the sixth amendment right to counsel attaches after indictment. Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). The unwanted disclosure before the grand jury may irreparably
harm the relationship between the attorney and client. See infra notes 100-106 and
accompanying text.
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helped incriminate the client in a federal crime.86 The Baird court's
consideration of the incriminating effect of disclosure creates a privi-
lege that protects clients' freedom to acquire attorneys and to fully
disclose information to those attorneys.
The communication-centered approach also draws an artificial and
unclear line between acknowledgements of guilt and mere evidence
pointing towards acknowledgements of guilt.8 7 The doctrine shields
acknowledgements of guilt as protected communications under the
attorney-client privilege.8 Statements that are mere evidence of
acknowledgements of guilt are evidentiary facts subject to discovery.89
The courts provide no clear line where client-provided information
tending toward guilt becomes an acknowledgement of guiltY0
Furthermore, without a definition of communication to guide them,
attorneys cannot predict whether the attorney-client privilege will pro-
tect a given exchange. The Supreme Court condemns doctrines that
have no predictive ability.9 The privilege is designed to encourage
clients to obtain counsel and to encourage client disclosure to coun-
sel. 92 If clients cannot be certain of confidentiality in a given situation,
the privilege will not encourage disclosure.
The communication-centered approach, which focuses on whether
present disclosure reveals past conversations, ultimately fails to
encourage clients to seek legal advice. Under this approach, courts
will not protect client administrative information standing alone, no
matter how incriminating. 9 Therefore, this approach ignores clients'
fears that prosecutors will exploit original consultations at trial. A
86. Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 633 (9th Cir. 1960) (the sought-after evidence "may be
the link that could form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a federal
crime"); see also Stem & Hoffman, supra note 3, at 1798 n.58.
87. See Glanzer & Taskier, Attorneys Before the Grand Jury: Assertion of the Attorney-Client
Privilege to Protect a Client's Identity, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1070, 1084 (1984).
88. See United States v. Liebman, 742 F.2d 807, 809 (3d Cir. 1984) (communications
privileged when disclosure would reveal client's motive for securing advice).
89. In Rabin v. United States, 896 F.2d 1267 (1lth Cir. 1990), the court acknowledged that a
payment of fees conveys information. Id. at 1274. An exchange conveying information is, by
definition, a communication. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 253 (5th ed. 1979). Because the client
in Rabin communicated to the attorney in private and in expectation of privacy, 896 F.2d at
1274, all of the elements of the attorney-client privilege were met. Despite acknowledging that
monetary exchanges convey potentially incriminating information, the Rabin court stated that
records of fees paid are privileged only if accompanied by another communication. Id.
90. See Rabin, 896 F.2d at 1274.
91. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981). Although Wigmore states that
courts should narrowly interpret the privilege, he cautions that interpretations must support the
goal of the privilege. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2292, at 554.
92. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
93. See In re Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591, 593-94 (9th Cir. 1983).
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doctrine that purports to encourage communication but penalizes con-
sultation is both paradoxical and counter-productive.94 Communica-
tion can only occur once clients initially contact their attorneys. A
doctrine cannot logically promote communication if it discourages
contact. 95
2. The Attorney-Centered Approach is Based on a Flawed Focus
Like courts following the communication-centered approach, courts
adhering to the attorney-centered approach incorrectly focus their
analysis of client administrative information. Under the attorney-cen-
tered approach, courts focus on whether disclosure of administrative
information harms attorneys.96 The attorney-client privilege, how-
ever, exists not for the sake of the legal profession in general, but for
the sake of clients needing legal advice.9 7  The attorney-centered
approach's concern that an attorney may have to choose between
obtaining full disclosure and protecting a client's rights does not
address the primary issues of the privilege.98 Protecting an attorney's
peace of mind should not be an end in itself. Whether disclosure of
administrative information affects an attorney is important only
because of the subsequent effect on the client.
Courts following the attorney-centered approach's exclusive focus
on an attorney's ability to provide competent legal advice ignore the
effect disclosure has on a client and thereby dilute the privilege. Even
94. Stem & Hoffman, supra note 3, at 1838.
95. Instead of protecting attorney-client communications, the communication-centered
approach may actually encourage prosecutors to call defense attorneys before grand juries.
Whether the doctrine shields administrative information depends upon prosecutors' knowledge
of the case. Id. at 1799. If prosecutors know the content of privileged attorney-client
conversations, but are unaware of the clients' names or fee information, then the privilege
protects client administrative information. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. If,
however, prosecutors have only incomplete information about clients, the doctrine will not shield
administrative information. Stem & Hoffman, supra note 3, at 1799. Consequently, the doctrine
provides relatively little protection during the opening stages of an investigation. Thus, the
confidential communication doctrine may encourage prosecutors to call attorneys to testify early
in an investigation. Id Although Justice Department rules bar unnecessary or premature
interrogation of defense counsels, these rules are not enforceable in court. ExEcuTrivE OFFICE
FOR THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES
AroRNEys' MANUAL § 9-2.161(a) (1985), quoted in Stem & Hoffman, supra note 3, app. A, at
1848. A client's only protection against prosecution interrogation of his or her attorney would be
the Justice Department's compliance with internal, unenforceable rules. Stem & Hoffman, supra
note 3, at 1799.
96. In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1984).
97. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2304, at 586.
98. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text (discussing primary purpose of the
attorney-client privilege); see also 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2291, at 545 ("apprehension of
compelled disclosure [of client confidences] must be removed").
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if an attorney must disclose every word the client speaks, the attorney
can still give competent legal advice. The quality of legal advice does
not necessarily depend on its confidentiality. Whether a client would
visit an attorney to receive that advice in the first place, however, may
depend on confidentiality.99 As the Supreme Court recognized, a cli-
ent who knows that the government could obtain damaging informa-
tion from his or her lawyer may be unable to obtain effective, informed
representation."ic Moreover, when a client has little choice but to
secure representation, such as in a murder charge or a multi-million
dollar civil suit, the attorney-centered approach may encourage clients
to shield information from their attorneys. Thus, this interpretation of
the confidential communication doctrine discourages clients from
obtaining fully-informed legal assistance and is repugnant to the goals
of the attorney-client privilege.'01
Under either the communication-centered approach or attorney-
centered approach, courts may compel attorneys to incriminate their
clients."2 Judicial compulsion, however, may eliminate a client's
assurance of receiving legal assistance. An attorney required to dis-
close incriminating information about a client has three options. First,
the attorney can disclose the information. The client, understandably,
may never trust the attorney again. 103 Second, the attorney can refuse
to answer. The court may then hold the attorney in contempt and
incarcerate the attorney."° Third, the attorney can withdraw from
the case.' 05 Ultimately, each of these options effectively denies the cli-
ent the counsel of his or her choice and reduces the effectiveness of the
attorney-client privilege. 106
C. The Courts Should Adopt Both the Confidential Communication
Doctrine and the Legal Advice Doctrine
In order to effectuate the goals of the attorney-client privilege in a
predictable manner, courts should enact a dual doctrine based on a
99. Shargel, 742 F.2d at 63 ("we would be less than candid not to concede that the lack of a
privilege against disclosure of the fact of an attorney-client relationship may discourage some
persons from seeking legal advice at all.").
100. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
101. Id. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, §§ 2290-91, at 543-49.
102. See supra notes 93 (communication-centered aproach allows disclosure even if client
incriminated), 96 (attorney-centered approach focuses exclusively on attorney) and
accompanying text.
103. Note, Benefactor Defense Before The Grand Jury: The Legal Advice and Incrimination
Theories of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 6 CARDOZO L. REv. 537, 567-68 (1985).
104. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(g); The Recalcitrant Witness Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1984).
105. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1989).
106. See Note, supra note 103, at 567-68 (discussing consequences of attorney disclosure).
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combination of both the legal advice doctrine and the confidential
communication doctrine. This new doctrine would require an initial
in camera defense showing that the dual rule applies to the client
administrative information in question. 1 7 Before compelling disclo-
sure, courts would require a prosecution showing either that the
defense reasons for asserting the privilege are false or that the desired
information is exempt from the privilege's protection. 0 8 If the defense
puts forth a prima facie case for protecting the information, and the
prosecutor cannot show falsity or fraud, then the privilege applies.
Moreover, courts should expressly include administrative informa-
tion under the attorney-client privilege."°9 Many courts have already
recognized that paying money or revealing an identity necessarily con-
veys information.110 Unless courts extend protection to administrative
information, potential clients will remain fearful of disclosure and will
not seek legal assistance."1
The proposed doctrine implements the policies of the attorney-client
privilege better than does the legal advice doctrine or the confidential
communication doctrine standing alone. The proposal is an improve-
ment on the status quo for three reasons. First, the proposal correctly
interprets the Baird precedent. Second, the proposed policy is predic-
tive. Third, the proposal effectuates the policies of the privilege with-
out the unnecessary excesses of an absolute privilege that would shield
all client administrative information.
L The Proposed Doctrine Correctly Interprets Precedent
The proposed dual doctrine correctly interprets the Ninth Circuit's
seminal Baird decision. The Baird court protected the clients' names
not only because disclosure would reveal previous attorney-client com-
munications, 1 2 but also because disclosure would incriminate the cli-
ents in the very situation for which they sought advice. 3 The
proposed dual doctrine retains the Baird court's multi-faceted analysis
107. The Sixth Circuit implied a similar procedure in In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-
2-35 (Durant), 723 F.2d 447, 452-53 (6th Cir. 1983).
108. Id.
109. The Cherney court ruled that incriminating information provided by the client as an
integral part of obtaining legal assistance is a communication. See supra note 72.
110. See Rabin v. United States, 896 F.2d 1267, 1274 (11th Cir. 1990).
111. In re Cherney, 898 F.2d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 1990).
112. Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 633 (9th Cir. 1960) (disclosure would reveal confidential
reason clients approached attorney).
113. Id. at 633 (when the IRS desired names only for their incriminating value, the court
protected the names, stating the names may be the evidence necessary to convict the clients of a
crime).
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of the attorney-client privilege. Courts exclusively adopting either the
legal advice doctrine or the confidential communication doctrine, on
the other hand, apply only portions of Baird and ignore language that
contradicts their positions. 1 4
2. The Proposal Is Predictive
Working together, the confidential communication doctrine and the
legal advice doctrine allow attorneys and clients to predict whether
courts will shield particular exchanges. Each doctrine eliminates the
ambiguities of the other. The legal advice doctrine avoids artificial
and unclear characterizations of communications between attorneys
and clients." 5 The confidential communication doctrine protects
administrative information that is unrelated to the case at bar, but that
reveals the substance of confidential communication. 116 This comple-
mentary coverage enables attorneys to foresee which communications
the privilege protects.
The combined doctrine also eliminates the vagaries inherent in the
confidential communication doctrine. Whether the information is an
acknowledgment of guilt or mere evidence of an acknowledgement of
guilt is irrelevant.117 Under the combined doctrine, the attorney-client
privilege shields all client-supplied incriminating information that
relates to the case at bar.'18 This change benefits clients by allowing
them to fully disclose information that may assist the growth of an
attorney-client relationship but that is not directly related to the origi-
nal controversy.
In exchanges unrelated to the case at bar, broadening the definition
of communication to include administrative data allows attorneys to
more accurately predict whether the attorney-client privilege applies.
Thus, attorneys could assure clients that courts will protect any
incriminating information provided as a necessary part of obtaining
counsel. 119 For example, a relative could help pay for a defendant's
legal fees without fear that the IRS, as part of a separate tax-evasion
case, will force the attorney to disclose who paid the fees. This greater
coverage and predictability encourages clients to seek legal assistance
and to fully disclose their cases to their attorneys.
114. See Note, supra note 103, at 557.
115. The legal advice doctrine focuses on whether disclosure is incriminating and does not
attempt to categorize the communication. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text (discusses legal advice doctrine).
119. In re Cherney, 898 F.2d 565, 568 (7th Cir. 1990); see supra notes 72 & 109.
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3. The Combined Doctrine Successfully Balances Courts' Duties
With Clients' Needs
The proposed combined doctrine provides a balanced interpretation
of the attorney-client privilege. Previous doctrines have been too
restrictive, thereby failing to encourage clients to obtain counsel.120 A
blanket privilege protecting all administrative information, on the
other hand, fails to further courts' duties to discover the truth. The
proposal seeks a middle ground, effectively balancing courts' duties to
discover and discern the truth with clients' needs to obtain
representation.
Modern courts have unjustifiably restricted the attorney-client privi-
lege through a strict interpretation of the Baird decision. This restric-
tive interpretation incorrectly implies that only guilty parties benefit
from the attorney-client privilege.' 2 ' The privilege, however, is more
than just an exclusionary rule."2 The attorney-client privilege is pri-
marily a right to privacy in dealings with an attorney.'23 As such, the
privilege stands as society's choice to have vigorous advocacy in an
adversary system.12 4
A total privilege shielding all client administrative information, on
the other hand, would unnecessarily hamper the judicial truth-finding
function. As the Supreme Court has indicated, courts should not
broadly construe privileges. 25 More narrow interpretations that pro-
vide for disclosure in the majority of instances help courts reach accu-
rate findings and increase the public's confidence in the legal system.
Rather than interpreting the attorney-client privilege too narrowly
or too broadly, the proposed dual doctrine balances individual needs
and governmental duties. Because the defense has the original burden
of production, a presumption remains in favor of disclosure.'26 If,
however, defense attorneys can show that disclosing client administra-
tive information incriminates their clients or reveals other confidential
communications, courts will protect that information. 127 In the event
120. See supra notes 93-106 and accompanying text.
121. McCoRMIcK, supra note 16, § 90, at 216. MCCORMICK asserts that Baird opened a
"false trail" to the general rule that administrative information is not privileged. Id
MCCORMICK argues for a narrow interpretation of the privilege, stating that the cases dealing
with administrative information have a "prevailing flavor of chicanery and sharp practice." Id
122. Glanzer & Taskier, supra note 87, at 1074 (quoting Loiusell, Confidentiality, Conformity
and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TuiL L. REv. 101, 110-11 (1956))
123. Id
124. See In re Chemey, 898 F.2d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 1990).
125. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
126. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
127. Id.
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that the defendant attempts to use the legal system for illegal purposes,
prosecutors have the authority to pierce the attorney-client privi-
lege.128 Through this process, the proposal achieves an equitable bal-
ance between an unnecessarily narrow interpretation and an excessive
blanket privilege for all administrative information.
III. CONCLUSION
Early commentators and courts examined the issue of client admin-
istrative information as it related to the greater goals and principles of
the attorney-client privilege. Modern courts, however, have formu-
lated exclusive doctrines to govern the release of client administrative
information. None of these doctrines, taken alone, adequately
addresses all of the considerations inherent in the attorney-client privi-
lege. The legal advice doctrine allows prosecutors to force disclosure
of client information not directly related to the case at bar. On the
other hand, under the confidential communication doctrine, prosecu-
tors can compel defense attorneys to disclose incriminating client
information. Each doctrine inhibits the formation of open attorney-
client relationships.
Rather than exclusively adopt one doctrine or the other, courts
should widen their perspective and view the doctrines as complemen-
tary devices to analyze the attorney-client privilege. Under this dual
proposal, courts can shield administrative information after a defense
showing based on either doctrine. This broader perspective of client
administrative information will allow courts more effectively to evalu-
ate each case in light of the fundamental policies underlying the attor-
ney-client privilege.
David B. Merchant
128. See supra note 27.
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